W.J. Astore
We must not allow a missing rung on America’s nuclear escalation ladder!
I get email notices for Aether, a professional journal for “strategic airpower & spacepower,” and the lead article on the cover caught my eye:
A Tactical Nuclear Mindset: Deterring with Conventional Apples and Nuclear Oranges
James R. McCue, Adam Lowther, and James Davis
Comparing and contrasting low-yield theater nuclear weapons with conventional precision strike weapons leads to a nuanced conclusion that both contribute to deterrence.
Imagine that! Both nuclear and conventional weapons “contribute to deterrence.” Even though they’re apparently apples and oranges. Well, there’s “nuance” for you.
Anybody want a tasty nuclear “orange”? Fresh and juicy, and with a low yield. It may very well deter you from eating citrus fruit for, well, forever.
I’m not familiar with the authors of the piece. McCue is an Air Force lieutenant colonel with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I don’t know about you, but suggesting that low-yield nukes can be used in nuanced ways heightens my sense of threat. Lowther directs strategic deterrence programs at the National Strategic Research Institute, which makes me think anew about the meaning of “deterrence.” In this case, it seems to mean the willingness to use nuclear weapons against “bad actors” like China but especially Putin and Russia. And Davis is an Army major assigned to U.S. Central Command. It’s nice to know the Army, just like the Air Force, has a strange love for nukes.
In essence, the article’s argument is this: Russia, China, and North Korea are “investing” in low-yield nukes while the U.S. and other NATO allies have generally been reducing their arsenals of the same. To deter those three adversaries, the U.S. must make new “investments” in low-yield nukes, because you never know what those foreigners are up to.
Here’s how the authors put it in their conclusion: “In the right circumstances conventional weapons offer greater certainty of destruction than tactical nuclear weapons. The West must examine what this means for warfighting, as well as what adversaries are signaling by investing in low-yield nuclear weapons. The best solution may be the development of a state-of-the-art nuclear capability that ensures certain, prompt, proportionate, and in-kind response options. The perception of a missing rung on the American escalation ladder could prove alluring to Russia or China in a conflict.”
Mr. President, we must not allow a missing rung on America’s escalation ladder!
Even if that “missing rung” is only a “perception.”
Let’s keep that in mind if nuclear weapons start flying in Europe or Asia. We can console ourselves that at least we weren’t missing a rung in our escalatory ladder as millions get blasted, burnt, and irradiated.